10. Higher Defence Management: Evolution and Reform

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Abstract

India's higher defence management is frozen in time. Established at the time when India became independent in 1947, it has not changed much despite repeated efforts at reform. A major reason for this is the dysfunctional relationship between the uniformed personnel and the civilian bureaucracy arising from strategies aimed at checking the military in an era when coups were common in the Third World.

Change can only come if it is led by the people who have the authority to transform it—the political class. But the political leadership of the country is content to let things run as they are. The few changes that have taken place have come in the wake of crises. Just what reform is needed is known to all. Commission after commission has, for example, recommended the appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), or a Permanent Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC). But to little avail. There are atavistic fears that such a person will be inordinately powerful and a threat to the republican system.

This situation has resulted in a less than optimal use of the Indian military forces and a tendency towards a strategy that emphasises strategic restraint. However, today, when a nuclear armed India confronts two major nuclear armed neighbours, the nature of its higher management must change. Decision-making must take place in a world where the nature of conflict itself has been transformed by the information revolution. Likewise, newer threats have emerged in the cyber domain. Neighbouring China has undertaken far-reaching reforms to modernise its higher defence management at the strategic and operational levels and this has implications for us.

War has always been fought at three levels: the strategic, the operational and the tactical. While the key determinants of the outcome of a war have been organisation and technology, deficiencies in both these areas have, often, been made up by better higher management, in other words, with agile and astute decision-making at the apex levels of the military and political systems.

The operational failures of British Generals at the outset of World War II, for example, were overcome by the war leadership and diplomatic abilities of Winston Churchill.

Today, the space among the three levels has flattened. In the information age, tactical events can have strategic effects— such as the breaching of the US Embassy in Saigon in the 1968 Tet offensive, or the 9/11 strike against the Twin Towers in New York.Any effective higher management system needs to take this reality into account.

Unlike the past wars, 21st century war has different characteristics. India which has fought wars with Pakistan and China, cannot contemplate an all-out war with them today because all three are nuclear weapon states and conventional conflict could rapidly escalate to a mutually destructive nuclear exchange. This does not, however, rule out hybrid war, blending the possibility of conventional skirmishes with irregular warfare and cyber warfare. Pakistan has, for example, successfully conducted a proxy sub-conventional war against India under a nuclear overhang.

Higher Management

It is in the domain of the strategic and the operational that we locate "higher management". In this paper, we will look at the strategic level, and refer to operational management only in passing. At that level, there are two elements: the political and the military.

The military plays a key role in any state because its key attribute of a state is its monopoly on violence within and outside sovereign borders. It also plays a key role of guaranteeing those borders and the political system of the state, be it democratic or authoritarian.

In democracies, Constitutions provide the laws and principles to govern the state and outline parameters and structures of formal control. Within the governance structure, there is a department or ministry whose responsibility is to organise, provision, direct and control the armed forces. *Responsibility* for formulating defence and security policy lies in the realm of the political class, who are not experts, while the task of *implementing* policy belongs to

the senior staff of the armed forces and an expert civilian bureaucracy. Given the complexity of modern life, it is evident that expert advice is needed by those who are responsible for formulating the policy. On the other hand, in view of the devastating consequences of modern war, the political class cannot ignore the process of implementation of defence and security policies.

The US Constitution made the President the Commander-in-Chief, as well as Chief Executive, but the specifics, such as the creation of a Joint Chiefs of Staff, or a National Security Council have been done through legislation whose most recent example is the Goldwater-Nichols Act passed by the US Congress to promote integration.[1]

China has a unique structure because the armed forces are the forces of the Party, not the state. The link between the two is complex and is maintained through the existence of a parallel Central Military Commission (CMC) with identical personnel, one of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and one of the state viz. the People's Republic of China (PRC). Under the new reforms, the "CMC Chairman responsibility system" has been mooted to strengthen the supreme authority of the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China who is the CMC Chairman.[2]

In India, though the President is the Supreme Commander, Article 74, section 1 notes: "There shall be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head to aid and advise the President who shall, in the exercise of his functions, act in accordance with such advice", so the Supreme Command rests with the President, while the responsibility for the "defence of India and every part thereof" rests with the Cabinet. The Cabinet, in turn, vests the main responsibility with one of its key committees, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), known earlier and variously as the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, the Emergency Committee, Cabinet Committee on National Security (CCNS) and, even Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs (CCPA), which performed the task of decision-making. But, as Prof P N Dhar has observed, the idea that the Prime Minister (PM) functions in some kind of a collegial system, presiding over these committees which actually make decisions, is obsolete. In fact, on issues relating to national security, the Prime Minister has been the key player, along with the Prime Minister's Office (PMO).[3]

On a day-to-day basis, the higher defence management is done by a Minister of Defence who functions within the ambit of the Government of India (Allocation of Business Rules) which have allocated to the Ministry of Defence

all the work relating to the defence of India. The Transaction of Business Rules and all defence related issues are dealt with by the minister-in-charge, subject to rules requiring him to consult with other departments and getting clearance of cases required from the CCS and the PM. In each department, there would be a Secretary who would be its administrative head, responsible "for the proper transaction of business and careful observance of these rules in that department." As NN Vohra, a former Defence Secretary, put it, "As per the constitutional framework, the overall responsibility of the Ministry of Defence rests entirely on the Raksha Mantri (Defence Minister) and the responsibility for ensuring that the business of the Department of Defence is transacted strictly in conformity with… rules is vested in the Defence Secretary." [4]

Though the rules refer to the Army, Navy and Air Force appointments, they have nothing to say about the responsibility of their chiefs. In practice, of course, the Defence Minister also supervises the military command structure which has no joint defence staff or unified command apparatus as yet. The minister exercises administrative and operational control over the three Services through their respective Chiefs of Staff. He is responsible not just for policies, but for the fiscal propriety as well as the efficiency with which policies are implemented. But he has no expert advice from his bureaucracy.

The sheer complexity of military operations by land, sea and air is such that the expertise is weighted on the side of the uniformed personnel, while authority lies with the politicians and their bureaucratic advisers. Balancing the authority of the politicians and the expertise of the Services is a delicate task, which should, in an ideal situation, be carried out by an expert civilian bureaucracy. In India, experience would suggest that the weight of influence of uniformed personnel within the higher defence organisation, despite the expertise, has been decreasing. As for the civilian bureaucracy, it has seldom performed its task of providing civilian expertise to the defence system. It remains stubbornly generalist and avoids expertise. This is to the detriment of the higher management because the political class exercises its authority through the bureaucracy.

The Indian Experience of National Security Management

India inherited a system in which the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) was both the head of the military as well as a "Defence Minister" by virtue of being a member of the Viceroy's Council. During his first interim government in September 1946, Nehru changed this by keeping the C-in-C out of the Cabinet

and insisting that all communications and decisions be routed through civilian officials of the Ministry of Defence. These officials then worked to downgrade the influence of the C-in-C by creating two new C-in-C positions for the Air Force and the Navy. Prime Minister Nehru later confirmed that the decision was aimed at reducing the role of the military in India.

Even while writing the new Constitution, the Constituent Assembly assumed the full powers of voting on expenditure, legislative approval and parliamentary oversight on all subjects, including defence, and a Cabinet of an Interim Government had assumed full executive control with a Defence Minister, Sardar Baldev Singh. The C-in-C became an Adviser to the Defence Minister, and was part of a Defence Minister's Committee along with the Defence Secretary and the Financial Adviser. The status of the chiefs was brought down, and that of the of the civilian Secretary of the ministry brought up, along with that of other civilian officers.

The Defence Committee of the Cabinet has an interesting history. In September 1947, viewing the carnage of partition, Nehru and Patel both decided to get the experienced Governor-General Lord Mountbatten to lend his expertise to the governance. Mountbatten suggested that his aide, Lord Ismay, look into the issue. Ismay suggested a three-tier system that had at its apex the Defence Committee of the Cabinet. The second level was the Defence Minister's Committee where the highest level military officials could sit, and the third comprised the three C-in-Cs, known as the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC). In addition, there was a Joint Intelligence Committee and a Joint Planning Committee which provided advice to the COSC which, in turn, offered it to the government. Ismay is also said to have recommended a Chief of Defence Staff, for single-point advice to the civilian system, but was overruled. The essence of Ismay's proposals was the need to maintain civilian supremacy over the armed forces.

With partition and the onset of the Junagadh crisis, Mountbatten was asked to chair a newly created Emergency Committee of the Cabinet. Within days, Mountbatten, with the concurrence of the PM and Deputy Prime Minister (DPM) decided to convert this into a Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC).[5]

The DCC was active through the entire Kashmir War that began in October 1947. Among its members were Mountbatten, Prime Minister Nehru, Deputy Prime Minister Vallabhbhai Patel, Baldev Singh, Minister of Finance, Shanmukham Chetty, Minister without portfolio Sir Gopalaswami Ayyangar. In attendance were the Service Chiefs, officials like the Secretary General in

the Ministry of External Affairs Girija Shankar Bajpai, Secretary of States VP Menon and Defence Secretary H M Patel.

The Indian intervention in Kashmir on October 27 was executed with competence and confidence. One reason for this was the presence of Mountbatten, a seasoned war leader, and another was that of Sardar Patel, who had in quick time assumed command of his portfolio, and officials like Bajpai and Menon.

An example of the functioning of the higher command system emerges from the episode of November 04, 1947, which found Sardar Patel and Baldev Singh at Srinagar airport, just kilometres away from where the last major attack of the raiders had been turned back the day before. They were briefed by the Army brass and they returned that evening to Delhi to report to the DCC, and their report formed the basis on which issued detailed instructions were issued, including operational objectives and the deadlines in which they were to be achieved. Thus, Baramulla was to be recaptured by November 09, Uri on November 13. Thereafter, the DCC took the political decision to order Brigadier LP Sen to swing south from Uri to ~~Punch~~, instead of pressing on to recapture Domel and Muzaffarabad. [6]

Another instance was as the Hyderabad crisis unfolded. On the eve of the operation, the British Commander-in-Chief, General Roy Bucher advised against the move, noting that the Pakistanis may launch a retaliatory strike on Amritsar. At the DCC meeting, where the final order was given, Bucher persisted in his opposition, upon which Sardar Patel told him bluntly that the Army would move on Hyderabad the following morning, and that the C-in-C was free to quit, if he did not agree with the order.

By the time the Hyderabad crisis ended and the ceasefire was declared on Kashmir on January 01, 1949, both the country and governmental system had a lot to be proud of. Under the leadership of Pandit Nehru, the governmental system had smoothly adjusted to the change of rulers, even though it had to overcome major challenges in certain areas. The country's armed forces had been consolidated and the steady "Indianisation" process had led to General K C Cariappa taking over as the first Indian Commander-in-Chief at the beginning of 1949.

Dealing with China

In the 1950s, the problem began from the top—the assessment of China itself. Among the last acts of Sardar Patel was a letter to Nehru warning him of the

possible adverse consequences of the Chinese occupation of Tibet for India. It was not as though the letter was ignored. But this system did not last too long. Principally, this was on account of Sardar Patel's death in December 1950 and Nehru's rift with C. Rajagopalachari, which imbalanced the Cabinet. Indeed, in the ensuing period, policy was formulated largely by the Prime Minister himself, and there is little evidence that the Cabinet played any role.

In 1955, the bureaucracy succeeded in dropping the title Commander-in-Chief of the heads of the three Services to mere Chiefs of Staffs of their respective arms. The collateral impact of this decision was that it diluted the ability of the political system from receiving single-point military advice.

When the new Allocation of Business Rules was declared in 1961, the three Services figured in Schedule 2 of the Allocation of Business Rules as "attached offices" of the Ministry of Defence which was in-charge of the preparation for defence, as well as the prosecution of war and its termination. In effect, the Services were outside the ministry and the government system, and were not central to the formulation of defence policy.

One of the consequences of the Patel letter of 1950 was the setting up of the Himmatsinghji Committee to look into the issue of coping with China's occupation of Tibet. The committee made a number of useful suggestions for improving the Indian logistical situation on the border.[7]However, the basic political assessment was that China was not a threat. This led to the far-reaching Sino-Indian agreement on trade and intercourse between India and the "Tibet Region of China" in 1954. India recognised China's control over Tibet and surrendered its special rights without any reciprocity.

It is only with the Longju and Kongka Pass incidents in 1959 that the political class awoke to the threat and allowed an expansion of the Army that had been severely drawn down, based on the belief that the primary threat was only from Pakistan. Though the Army had been formally given the responsibility of the McMahon Line, the region simply lacked the infrastructure, and the Army, the manpower to effectively police it.

Additionally, the handling of the higher echelons of the military was casual. Perhaps this is best brought out by the episode in August 1959 in which Army Chief General K.S. Thimayya sent in his resignation after getting fed up of the behaviour of Defence Minister V K Krishna Menon. Nehru persuaded him to withdraw his resignation, but later in Parliament, criticised the General and praised Menon. Raghavan has pointed out that the issue was less about civilian interference in military matters and more as resistance to having the military

intrude in politics.[8] The result of this was that Menon and a coterie of officers he encouraged, including B M Kaul, became principal military advisers to the government, and the professional chain of command was ignored. Following Thimayya's departure, Menon got a pliant Army Chief and appointed Kaul the Chief of General Staff and the stage was set for the 1962 fiasco.

There is little evidence that the Defence Committee of the Cabinet played any role or in vetting the Forward Policy that was decided upon by Nehru and Menon, backed by Kaul, in early 1960.[9] The implications of establishing posts by lightly armed small groups in areas with significant Chinese military presence was based on the political assessment, fed by the Intelligence Bureau, that there would be no Chinese military response. This required some hard-headed political evaluation of the Chinese intentions, and a corresponding matching of the Indian political goals with its military capacity, but that never happened. Instead, there remained a gap between the political goals of the government—the Ministries of Defence and External Affairs, and the Prime Minister and the military capability they had permitted India to have at the time.

Many in the military felt that Menon did not even bother to take up the issues to the DCC. After becoming the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) and Chief of General Staff (CGS) respectively, Thapar and Kaul frantically sought to push the Defence Ministry to make up the significant shortfall in equipment and materials, with the latter using his influence to take up the matter with Nehru. But, according to Kaul, Nehru bluntly told him that importing weapons would be too expensive and jeopardise the country's economy; and acquiring them as a military ally of another power would undermine its non-aligned status. In the long run, India had to rely on indigenous production of weapons. It was, therefore, based on a political assessment that India did not face a major threat from China.

As PVR Rao has pointed out, important issues were discussed ad hoc by the Prime Minister, Defence Minister and some senior Army officers; "The Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Joint Intelligence Committee or the Joint Planning Committee were either moribund or ineffective." The other Service Chiefs were not consulted, neither were the Secretaries and the DCC informed of the decisions after they had been taken.[10]

In the main, the decisions were taken by Nehru and Menon. This was evident from the sordid drama that saw the sidelining of XXXIII Corps commanded by Umrao Singh and the creation of a new IV Corps commanded by Kaul to carry out the operation that Singh said was not feasible with the forces on hand—

the eviction of the Chinese from Thagla Ridge. Nehru's patronage of Kaul was such that he overturned the military hierarchy and made the military higher command system defunct.

Later, as the war broke out, an ill Kaul was allowed to go back to his command and the Indian Air Force (IAF) was refused permission to block the Chinese advance. Nehru also took the momentous decision to enter into a military alliance with the US without consulting his Cabinet.

Following the war, the DCC and the erstwhile Foreign Affairs Committee were merged to create an Emergency Committee of the Cabinet (ECC). The ECC became the principal forum of decision-making, though decisions usually emanated from the PM and were given to the ECC and the Cabinet.

In the meantime, a new Defence Minister's Morning Meeting was initiated, though this was self-consciously mooted as an informal gathering of the Service Chiefs and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) officials with the minister, rather than a formal meeting. In any case, this also became redundant in the 1970s, but was revived in the 1990s. Of these meetings, NN Vohra has noted, that the chiefs tended to raise trivial matters in these meetings and take up important issues in one-on-one meetings with the Defence Minister or the Prime Minister, thereby detracting from presenting joint advice on matters relating to security.[11]

The 1965 India-Pakistan War

The 1962 experience resulted in more caution on the part of the political leaders.As soon as the government learnt of the Pakistani infiltration into Kashmir in August 1965, Prime Minister Shastri convened the Emergency Committee of the Cabinet and received an assurance from the Army Chief General J N Chaudhuri that the Army and the police had the situation under control. Subsequently, Shastri developed a plan to deal with the situation and convened a meeting of his full Cabinet on August 12 and got an endorsement for his policy line which was to deal with the situation with the forces on hand and avoid any reference to the UN.[12]

In the 1965 War, the civilians let the military take the operational decisions, but they still provided leadership in taking key decisions. Thus, Defence Minister Yashwantrao Chavan personally approved of the use of the Indian Air Force when things started to go bad in Chamb on September 01, but a couple of hours later, he cleared it with the Emergency Committee of the Cabinet. At the same time, he sought, and got, authorisation for the use of the Army

on the Punjab front which was done subsequently on September 05/06. The ECC was frequently convened, twice, for example on September 04 when the government had to finalise a reply to the UN Secretary General U Thant. Chavan also exercised his leadership in ordering the IAF not to escalate things in East Pakistan.[13]

There were failures at the operational level. The abilities of the Army Chief General JN Chaudhuri upon who Shastri and Chavan relied, were exaggerated, and his personality flawed. Air Chief Marshal PC Lal has pointed out in his memoirs, that even after the clashes in the Rann of Kutch, "No contingency plans were drafted, nor were the three Services asked to define the parts that they would have to play in the event of a war." He was 'informed' by Chaudhuri that plans had been discussed with the political leadership, "and necessary sanction obtained", but what these were, the Army Chief did not bother to inform his Air Force colleague.

Lieutenant General Harbhaksh Singh has written about how Chaudhuri panicked after the Pakistan Army launched an offensive in Khem Karan and ordered a retreat to the Beas bridge, which meant the abandoning of the Amritsar *doab*. Fortunately, Singh refused and his forces on the ground converted the defeat into India's only victory in the war.

Through August, the month in which the Indian Army battled thousands of Pakistani infiltrators and launched substantive operations, that included the capture of the Haji Pir Pass, there was no Army-Air Force coordination. Only on September 01, when Grand Slam began and a strong Pakistani armoured force rolled over the Indian positions in Chamb and moved towards Akhnur, did General Chaudhuri rush to the IAF and demand assistance. On September 06, when the Army began its major offensives towards Lahore across the International Border (IB), the IAF was not informed, resulting in a fiasco.

A semi-official assessment of the war confirms that the war was largely run as an Army operation, even though there were regular meetings of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. This had a negative consequence in the conduct of operations. The lack of institutional decision-making also played a role in the decision to terminate the war. According to K Subrahmanyam, Prime Minister Shastri agreed to the ceasefire because the Army Chief General Chaudhuri wrongly informed him that there was no point in continuing operations since the Army was running short of ammunition.[14]

The Bangladesh Crisis of 1971

In the tenure of Lal Bahadur Shastri who was only *primus inter pares* in the Cabinet, a Prime Minister's Secretariat was created to assist him in fulfilling the complex tasks of his job. By the time of the Prime Ministership of Indira Gandhi, the Secretariat had evolved as an important element in the higher management of governance, including security. Initially she needed outside advice to assist her in taking over the reins of government, but subsequently, this evolved into a kind of a court system reminiscent of the Mughals which was suspicious of any criticism.

The Bangladesh crisis showed how this worked. The Indian policy was run tightly by the PM herself, assisted by a group comprising her Principal Private Secretary, PN Haksar, Ambassador to Moscow and later Chairman, policy planning division of the External Affairs Ministry, DP Dhar, chief of the new external intelligence agency, RN Kao, Prof PN Dhar, who later replaced Haksar, and TN Kaul, the Foreign Secretary. But the group also included T Swaminathan, the Cabinet Secretary, KB Lall, the Defence Secretary, and it remained in touch with Govind Narain, the Home Secretary, IG Patel, Secretary for Economic Affairs and General S H F J Manekshaw. The political aspects of the Bangladesh issue were handled by the CCPA.[15]

In his memoirs, PC Alexander recounts Mrs Gandhi's recollection on the eve of the disastrous Operation Bluestar, as to how she had handled the issues. In the presence of the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) Chief R N Kao, she told him that "she never interfered with decisions of those in command of the field operations. She used to discuss with the senior Generals the broad objectives and apprise them of important political considerations to be kept in view, but would leave the decisions on the specifics of the operations entirely to them." [16]

Raghavan has shown how the Prime Minister depended on the advice of R N Kao, Haksar and Dhar and the formal military advice through the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Army Chief Gen S H FJ Manekshaw. This advice was for cautious action, beginning with support to a guerrilla campaign against the Pakistani forces in the erstwhile East Pakistan.[17]

While this was undoubtedly a talented group, the military was not quite involved in all aspects of decision-making. Whether or not this was responsible for the loss of Chamb, has not really been studied in detail.

The Official History of the conflict notes that the government gave a three-point directive to the armed forces: (1) to assist the Mukti Bahini in liberating a part of Bangladesh where the refugees could be sent and from where a

Bangladesh government could be run; (2) to prevent Pakistan from capturing any Indian territory of consequence in J&K, Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat; (3) to defend India's integrity against any Chinese attack from the north.

While the first objective was completely altered by the flow of events leading to the surrender of the Pakistan Army and the liberation of all of Bangladesh, the second directive was problematic and probably led to the loss of Chamb. It also reduced the freedom of the Indian commanders to concentrate their forces and manoeuvre for decisive action. [18]

When Indira Gandhi returned to power in 1980, decision-making became more personalised and opaque. She depended a lot on her sons, first Sanjay, and then Rajiv Gandhi, who, in turn, had their own coteries of advisers and hangers-on. A major security review, however, did lead to important decisions being taken with regard to the defence and security of the country relating to defence against China, the nuclear, missile and Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) programmes. But there was no change in the institutional arrangements to address the new and more complex challenges. The armed forces remained outside the governmental system and key decisions were taken by the leadership either through informal consultations or through individuals like G Parthasarthi, or close advisers like R Venkataraman, who later became President.

Rajiv Period

Rajiv Gandhi's sudden accession to power was a handicap of sorts. His higher management system was not too different from that of his mother—reliance on close aides, in this case, Arun Nehru and Arun Singh. Two events, one linked to Exercise Brasstacks and Pakistan and the other to developments with China that led to Operation Falcon and Exercise Chequerboard, brought out the weaknesses in the system of higher management. The decision to have the Indian Army defend Tawang in depth had been taken by the CCPA in 1983, yet, when the Army began moving up in Operation Falcon in 1986, there were questions and recriminations from the civilian leadership.[19]

The Sri Lankan intervention revealed its own problems. New Delhi sent conflicting signals by simultaneously maintaining ties with the Liberation of Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) through the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) and ordering the Indian Army to bring them to the negotiating table through military action. This was manifested by the completely inadequate assessment of the situation at the time of the Indian military intervention.[20]

Day-to-day higher management was done in New Delhi through a Core Group chaired by Natwar Singh, Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), and comprising the chiefs of the three Services, heads of R&AW, Intelligence Bureau, Joint Secretary level officers of the MEA and the PMO. In practice, the Army Vice Chief attended the meetings and key decisions were taken by the PM and the Army Chief.

This Core Group was assisted by a cell established at the Military Operations Directorate of the Army Headquarters (HQ). It comprised the Vice Chiefs of the three Services and their staff officers. It assisted the Core Group and briefed the higher civilian authorities, but essentially each Service functioned on its own under its chief.

The tri-Service expeditionary operation lacked a unified commander though Lieutenant General Depinder Singh, who was General Officer Commanding-in-Chief (GOC-in-C) of the Southern Command in Pune, had been appointed the Overall Force Commander (OFC) in June 1987, before the Indian Peace-Keeping Force's (IPKF's) induction in Jaffna. He set up a HQ in Madras, but he had no operational control over the Air Force and Navy elements. Major General Harkirat Singh who led the 54 Div has pointed out that the only instructions he received prior to the rushed deployment of his formation, were the contents of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. He has also pointed out that the Core Group Cell decisions were not given to his 54 Div HQ by either, and even platoon and company level battles were micro-managed by the Army HQ.[21]

Worse was the developing rift between the Army and the civilian authorities led by the Prime Minister. The crises around Brasstacks and Operation Falcon/Chequerboard as it is, disillusioned Rajiv Gandhi who then got estranged from both Arun Singh and Arun Nehru and chose to reassert tight political control over the military through Defence Minister K C Pant.

Arun Singh Committee

The Committee on Defence Expenditure headed by Arun Singh arose out of the economic and political crisis of 1990-91 when the government was confronted by the collapse of the Soviet Union, along with the uprising in J&K and a more belligerent Pakistan. To stave off pressure for increased spending, Prime Minister VP Singh constituted the committee which made wide-ranging recommendations for the entire defence set-up.

It was the first to recommend that the Chiefs of Staff be relieved of their operational role and absorbed into the government as Chiefs of Staff to the

Defence Minister and be involved in planning and equipping the forces which would be handled by theatre commanders. It also recommended allowing the ordnance factories to wither on the vine, as well as the handing over of the responsibility of revenue expenditure to the Service Chiefs, however, this, was quietly shelved after the Singh government collapsed.[22]

Being the first committee to take up the issue of reform, it met up with strong headwinds from entrenched interests in each Service, as well as the bureaucracy. No copies of its report exist but the committee's recommendations were,in a sense, retrieved in 2001 when the Kargil Review Committee and the Group of Ministers came up with their reform proposals. Singh was appointed as the head of the task force on restructuring the higher defence apparatus by the Group of Ministers.

The National Democratic Alliance-I

The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) came to power as the party with a difference. Among the first things that the government did, even in its 13-day tenure in 1996, was to order a nuclear weapons test which was aborted because the government fell. Subsequently, when a more stable government took office in March 1998, the tests were again ordered and took place that May.

In this case, the decision-making was necessarily secretive. So, the key personnel in the decision-making were Prime Minister Vajpayee, his Principal Private Secretary Brajesh Mishra and the heads of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Department of Atomic Energy (DAE). The ~~politicians~~ were brought in at the last minute.

Subsequent to the test, the government moved fast to create the institutions necessary for a more holistic view of security by creating a National Security Council (NSC), assisted by a National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) and a Strategic Policy Group (SPG). A new position of a National Security Adviser (NSA) was created.

The NSC, with its membership paralleling that of the CCS, was deliberately aimed at looking at evolving threats. However, how effective it has been is not clear. For years together, it has not met regularly; the SPG's record of meetings is even less clear, and the NSAB is now a truncated advisory group. The National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS), however, manages to do good work in assisting the NSA.

In 1999, the system received another series of shocks. First was the Kargil incursion in early 1999, and then, at the end of the year, came the hijack of IC814

to Kandahar. If the former brought out the deficiencies in the higher defence management of the country, the latter showed that the crisis management machinery to deal with terrorist incidents was simply not up to the challenges that the country confronted.

To set things right, the government set up a Kargil Review Commission (KRC) under the chairmanship of K Subrahmanyam. According to the KRC, the Pakistani intrusion "came as a complete and total surprise to the Indian government, Army and intelligence agencies…."[23] The report brought out the gaps in the area of intelligence, technology and the higher management, evidenced by the fact that the first formal meeting of the CCS took place only on May 25, 1999, in which the use of the air ~~option~~ was cleared.[24]

The Kargil War itself was carefully managed by the political authorities, once the Indian response was firmed up. There were almost daily meetings of the CCS with the three chiefs, Defence Secretary, Cabinet Secretary, Home Secretary, Finance Secretary, the IB and R&AW chiefs. This was important because of the political direction to confine the war to the area of incursion for both diplomatic purposes, as well as to prevent any escalation that could lead to a nuclear conflict.

For its part, the KRC acknowledged that the Mountbatten-Ismay framework had seen little change "in the past 52 years," despite the many wars the country had fought, the growing nuclear challenge, the end of the Cold War, the proxy war in J&K and the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).[25] It observed that "India is perhaps the only major democracy where the Armed Forces Headquarters are outside the apex governmental structure." This system had led to the Service Chiefs functioning as operational commanders instead of being Chiefs of Staff, resulting in negative consequences. So the KRC recommended structural reforms to bring about closer and more constructive interaction between the civil government and the Services. In view of this, it called for a thorough review of the country's national security management.[26]As a result, the government constituted a Group of Ministers, chaired by Union Home Minister L K Advani, on April 17, 2000, to thoroughly review the national security system in its entirety.

The 2001 Group of Ministers' Report on Reforming the National Security System (hereinafter GoM) constituted the most extensive set of reform proposals in the country's history. The new procedures and structures created were aimed at, among other things, "to anticipate current and emerging security threats" including the nuclear and missile developments.[27]

By itself, the GoM was a new example of higher defence management where a group of ministers, who were also members of the Cabinet Committee on Security deliberated on a range of reform issues, assisted by four high-powered task forces. They made their recommendations quickly and then, as members of the CCS, approved those decisions and sought to implement them.

Among the key recommendations of the GoM was one for the appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), along with a Vice Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS) to head an Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) organisation to enhance "jointness" and promote better planning. Another important recommendation of the GoM was the integration of the Service (armed forces) Headquarters with the Ministry of Defence.

A key goal of the GoM reforms was to enhance the "jointness" of the armed forces. The CDS/VCDS system, along with the creation of a defence staff and the cross-posting of officers in the Operations, Intelligence and Plans Directorates in the Service Headquarters were the first major steps in this direction.

The report was approved by the government on May 11, 2001, with the modification that a view on the recommendation relating to the institution of the CDS would be taken after consultations with various political parties. As for integrating the MoD and the Services, all that happened was that while the headquarters was renamed as the "Integrated Headquarters" ~~of the MoD,~~ little else changed.

This was because the political leadership did not see it fit to change the Allocation of Business Rules (AOBR) of the ministry, which ignore the three Service Chiefs and give the "Department of Defence," in the charge of the Defence Minister, the responsibility for the "defence of India and every part thereof, including preparation for defence and all such acts as may be conducive in times of war to its prosecution." The accompanying Transaction of Business Rules (TOBR) make it clear that the "Secretary" of the Ministry of Defence shall be "the administrative head (of the Department of Defence) thereof and shall be responsible for the proper transaction of business."

While the AOBR do mention the Army, Navy and Air Force, the TOBR have nothing to say about the responsibilities of the chiefs of the three Services. When it comes to "the proper transaction of business" of the MoD, only the civilian Defence Secretary is deemed as the responsible authority.

But, from the outset, it was clear that the position of CDS would not get approval immediately because the NDA government wanted political consultations before making a decision. However, it later transpired that the

United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government was not in favour of appointing such person and the result was that the UPA tenure saw the position unfilled and the integration of the armed forces and planning process was severely constrained.

In 2001, however, the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) was created and a three-star officer appointed as its chief. The IDS became the Secretariat of the Chairman, COSC. The COSC, chaired by the seniormost serving Service Chief, comprises the three chiefs to which the Chief of Integrated Defence Staff, who rotates among the three Services, was added as a non-voting member. The COSC, as we noted earlier, hearkened back to 1947 as the third layer of the Mountbatten reforms to advise the Defence Minister and, through him, the CCPA/CCS on all matters relating to military affairs.

Nuclear Command

On January 04, 2003, after the military standoff with Pakistan following the terrorist attack on Parliament House, the government announced a new set of decisions relating to the higher defence management. A Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) comprising a Political Council and an Executive Council was created to lend weight to India's nuclear deterrence posture. The Political Council is chaired by the Prime Minister. It is the sole body which can authorise the use of nuclear weapons. An amendment in the TOBR on March 26, 2003, noted that cases relating to the implementation of the nuclear doctrine and handling and deployment of strategic assets would be dealt with by the Political Council.

The Executive Council is chaired by the NSA. It provides inputs for decision-making by the Nuclear Command Authority and executes the directives given to it by the Political Council. The CCS also appointed a C-in-C Strategic Forces Command to manage and administer the Strategic Forces. The announcement was made through a press release which also outlined the country's nuclear doctrine. Subsequently, the NSA also appointed a senior military officer located in his Secretariat to supervise strategic planning.

The Naresh Chandra Committee

A decade after the GoM report, the government of the day felt that there was need to revisit the issue of higher defence management. There were several reasons for this. First, some of the reform measures had been deflected by vested interests. Second, the Mumbai attack of 2008 brought out the continuing

weaknesses of the system. Third, the global situation had changed dramatically with the economic crisis of 2008 and the rise of China was now manifesting itself by a greater assertiveness on the part of Beijing.

By 2011, it was clear that many of the reforms pushed by the GoM had only been partially implemented even though they had been cleared by the CCS. When the CCS has adopted a course, it is generally followed, but what does happen is that subsequent decisions and directives are interpreted and reinterpreted to undermine the basic thrust of a particular reform.

An example of this was the sleight-of-hand in the Ministry of Defence prefixing "Integrated Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence" to Army, Navy and Air Force Headquarters in New Delhi without actually integrating them to the ministry. In 2009, the Standing Committee of the Ministry of Defence (SCOD)noted that the cross-staffing of civilians and uniformed personnel to the Additional Secretary level had yet to be implemented, and dismissed the placement of non-uniformed officers in the IDS to be insufficient, observing, "The committee fails to understand how the cross-staffing pattern in the structure of HQ IDS can address the recommendations of the Committee which relate to the appointment of Armed Forces personnel in the Ministry of Defense".[28]

~~In~~ 2011, the Congress-led UPA government set up the Naresh Chandra Committee (NCC) headed by former Cabinet Secretary Naresh Chandra whose task was to provide a holistic set of recommendations in relation to national security, relating to planning, doctrines, objectives, as well as organisation and institutions. The report, presented in 2012, was broken down into some ~~4,000~~ separate recommendations by the NSCS and presented to the government.

A major weakness of the Indian system is the lack in laying down of clear-cut objectives of India's defence and security policies and, flowing from this, a balanced response between the threats – real and potential – and the capabilities India needed to deal with them. The NCC suggested that the country enunciate a formal National Security Doctrine, incorporating elements of traditional and non-traditional security, and come up with a public document on a national security strategy, outlining the country's defence and foreign policies. These steps were aimed at bringing the entire system—from the political leadership, the various ministries and departments and the armed forces—onto one page in relation to security issues.

Given the experience of the GoM recommendationsthe, the NCC specifically focussed on the need to change the AOBR and TOBR, observing that

the change of nomenclature of the Service Headquarters to "integrated HQ of MoD" resulted in "no substantial delegation of authority to the Service Chiefs." In the prevailing situation, the minister continued to run the MoD and the civilian Secretary remained responsible "for the proper transaction of business" of the Ministry. The NCC felt the need for suitable amendments to the AOBR and TOBR to reflect the responsibilities of the new permanent Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) (one of its principal recommendations) and the Service Chiefs, "insofar as their command functions, the defense of India and the conduct of war are concerned."[29]

An important set of recommendations for the integration of the armed forces headquarters with the civilian Ministry of Defence related to functional integration and cross-staffing which would see military personnel in the chain of command of the Defence Secretary's office and civilian officers in the Service Headquarters. The NCC noted that the Defence Secretary "needs to have a good mix of uniformed personnel and civilians at all verticals. Preferably, a special cadre of defence specialists should be introduced into the civil service to ensure knowledge build-up among the civilian staff."

Once again, the recommendations were undermined, this time by the political class itself. The Ministry of Defence and, indeed, the Defence Minister himself, weighed against the key recommendation on the appointment of the permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee publicly, even before the Cabinet Committee on Security had the opportunity to consider the recommendations.[30]

National Democratic Alliance-II Government

There were expectations that the NDA-II government would quickly move on the reforms proposed by the Naresh Chandra Committee. Many of them had a consensus within the strategic community itself. For example, in 2013, the three Service Chiefs agreed on the need for a Permanent Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee and wrote to the government informing them of their consensus.[31]

Instead of working along the detailed proposals of the Naresh Chandra Committee, the new Minister of Defence, Manohar Parrikar, struck off on his own to appoint an 11-man committee headed by retired Lieutenant General D B Shekatkar in May 2016, with a limited remit of seeking proposals to enhance the combat potential of the Services and rebalance defence expenditure. The committee submitted its report in early 2017, making some 188 recommendations and though its ~~remit~~ was limited, and its focus

on readjusting defence expenditure, it too, recommended the creation of a Permanent Chairman, COSC or a CDS as its central recommendation.[32] As of now, no decision has resulted from this.

Conclusion

In his outstanding study on the Indian military and the state, Steven I Wilkinson has shown that beginning with the 1950s, higher defence management in the country was deliberately structured "to minimise the risk of military intervention in politics." Lamentably, he observed, at the time his study was published in 2015, that there had been no major change even though ~~such strategies~~ were seen "as an increasing drag on the country's military efficiency and anti-terrorist strategies." The structures of the 1950 included keeping the military out of defence planning, lack of integrated civil-military structures for command and control, integrated intelligence gathering, and a Chief of Defence Staff to promote integrated military solutions.[33] As for the Army, the only change ~~had~~ been in the splitting of the General Staff Branch and the creation of the positions of Vice Chief of Army Staff and Deputy Chief of Army Staff to distribute the work. Subsequently, a Directorate of Perspective Planning was also created. The setting up of the Integrated Defence Staff organisation has been useful for the COSC, but minus a permanent head for that organisation, its impact cannot be optimised.

Many of these reforms, especially those calling for the creation of a CDS-like figure have been proposed for a long time. But to little avail. Likewise, despite claims to the contrary, the Ministry of Defence and the armed forces headquarters remain as separate entities and as dysfunctional as ever. The armed forces are seldom involved in strategic planning, and while they may be consulted by the CCS, it may be only to respond to specific questions, rather than in an institutionalised fashion as the Chiefs of Staff Committee. A major reason for this is the fear that a CDS will become too powerful a figure. There is an unstated fear of a military coup within the system which encourages the politicians and bureaucrats to keep the uniformed personnel in check.

The present COSC system suffers from many flaws, notably that it puts too much of a burden on the rotating Chairman who is simultaneously the head of his Service. In any case, even as Chairman, COSC, he is not first among equals. Further, the organisation of the Services does not help in promoting jointness. To take but one example—the HQ of the Eastern Naval Command is in Vishakhapatnam, while that of the IAF is at Shillong and of the Army, in Kolkata. The road to reform and reorganisation is clearly a long one.

Anecdotal information and Wilkinson's study suggest that the need to ensure control over the armed forces by the political class and the bureaucracy informs the higher defence management of the country. This, in turn, has led to India's indifferent record in higher defence management, and the shaping of its contemporary strategic culture that emphasises "strategic restraint" and encourages a status quo mentality. ~~The shortcomings afflict its political and bureaucratic, as well as intellectual class.~~ India's national security decision-making processes remain archaic, as indeed, does its military organisation.

If the military high command remains divorced from national security decision-making, it also remains hopelessly divided into parochial service segments, with which the political and bureaucratic class is quite happy since it divides the armed forces into three competing elements and, hence, weakens them. Within each Service, too, there is a parochialism, that has a negative impact on the running of a modern military.

The urge to reform has been crisis-driven and once the crisis passes, the system reverts to its previous state of lethargy. In today's networked world, India cannot continue to handle its defence system by the time-tested methods. Crises in a nuclear environment often require time-urgent intervention and ~~response and~~ have strategic implications.

The last two decades have seen a major transformation in the challenges that the higher defence management confronts. A resurgent China has outpaced India in almost every department of national power and there is little that we can do in the short or medium terms to change that. A Pakistan, unstable and weak and armed with nuclear weapons is a major danger for the country. Though we have overcome substantial challenges and neutralised others, separatism remains a major threat. The rise of Maoism is another major ~~threat~~. Non-traditional threats abound and then there are the unknowns like cyber attacks and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) terrorism.

The conflict spectrum now runs from the nuclear to the virtual realm of cyber space through the conventional and sub-conventional domains. The time and space between the strategic, operational and tactical levels of action have narrowed dramatically in a networked world. Communications technology encourages political leaders and bureaucrats to believe that they have a better understanding of the battle space than is actually the case. Actually, in many ways and in some circumstances, civilian and even top level military control may become less, not more, effective.

In the 1960s, the politicians decided to give the Indian military operational autonomy, even while retaining strategic command. But today, this may no longer feasible. As Mrs Gandhi's experience over Blue Star in 1984 suggested, a tactical operation can have strategic consequences. We also need to factor in the nuclear forces of our adversaries and the dangers of nuclear escalation. As the Kargil experience showed, the political class had to remain involved in the operational issues to ensure that the ~~Indian~~ reponse ~~was~~ tightly focussed in the area where the incursion took place.

Logic would, therefore, suggest much flatter organisation structures, and given the potentially catastrophic nature of threats, built in redundancies to deal with them. Networking capabilities can be reworked to enable greater autonomy at the tactical level, and integration at the strategic level. But for this, the topmost layer of the structure, that of the political class, must pay intelligent and sustained attention to the management of national security, as they had begun to do in the wake of the Kargil crisis but have since been distracted. Likewise, they need to ensure that the second layer, that of the bureaucracy, does not confine itself to procedural issues, but actively participates in shaping defence policy, which it can only do if it develops the requisite expertise.

The Way Forward

The task on hand is huge. We need to reorganise the manner in which decision-making takes place at the apex level viz. the CCS and the NSC. The issue is not so much of authority, but of their linkages with each other and with subordinate organisations. In other words, the manner in which the CCS relates to the Committee of Secretaries which does not have any representation from the armed forces, on the one hand, and to the NSC, which is essentially similar in composition to the CCS, but its subordinate outfits are the NSCS system headed by the NSA and comprising two additional outfits, the Strategic Policy Group and the National Security Advisory Board, on the other.

The crucial difference here is that the CCS, which is responsible to Parliament, is, by law, the country's highest decision-making body in the area of security, while the NSC is merely a body set up by administrative fiat which recommends policy. But while the NSC is assisted by the SPG which comprises the key Secretaries, the three chiefs and the intelligence heads, there is no comparable body assisting the CCS.

As for the MoD, there are two key areas of reform. First, the genuine integration of the uniformed personnel into the ministry by making them

hold key bureaucratic appointments at the Joint Secretary or even Additional Secretary level. Second, the appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff who will, in the first stage, head the Chiefs of Staff Committee and have responsibility for all tri-Service institutions and extra-regional contingencies. And, in the second, aid in the establishment of theatre commands and functional commands. The third important issue is to clearly define the responsibilities of the CDS as the principal military adviser to the Defence Minister and the Prime Minister, and that of the Defence Secretary who will be the principal civilian adviser.

~~Clearly, the~~ responsibilities of the CDS will fall on the operational side and that of the Defence Secretary on the provisioning. But there ought to be a structured overlap which will be to the benefit of the country's security management.

Clearly, then, we need to explore the way forward to achieve these goals. Ideally, of course, the Cabinet Committee on Security ought to take the lead in the issue. That is what it, more or less, did in the case of the Group of Minister's recommendations in 2001. However, the subsequent experience revealed that even the fact that the CCS had passed the recommendations of the GoM did not really prevent their being undermined and reinterpreted. In the case of the Naresh Chandra Committee, the proposals did not reach the CCS. They ~~were~~ simply left to wither on the vine. The same will be the fate of the much narrower recommendations of the Shekatkar Committee.

~~In the Government of India, the~~ Prime Minister and his Cabinet are responsible for conducting the business of the Government of India, which, in turn, is done through Ministries, Departments, Secretariat and offices. The key outfit in dealing with security is the Standing Committee of the Cabinet which has variously been called the Cabinet Committee on Security, the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs and the Cabinet Committee on National Security. In each department, it is the Secretary who is the administrative head and responsible for the proper transaction of business of that department.

A simple reading would suggest that the Defence Secretary is then responsible for all the preparations for the defence of India, as well as the conduct of the armed forces and their headquarters. But we know this is not how it works. The Defence Secretary has never been held to account for anything. This is because the rules contain nothing by way of sanctions for officers and ministers who fail to do their allotted duty. This is because these Allocation of

Business Rules and Transaction of Business Rules are only issued in the name of the President. But the reality is that they have been drafted by the officials themselves with no legislative sanction.

The Government of India's processes and procedures are designed to prevent any change. In the case of the Naresh Chandra Committee, for example, all the departments concerned briefed the committee and many ought to have, but did not, put forward their reservations. These were brought out only when the committee report as per procedure, was played back to them, where they opposed many of the measures that they had remained silent on at the time the committee had sought their views. In any case, the way the Government of India works, there is nothing sacrosanct about the recommendations of a committee or even a CCS decision. There are ways in which they can be interpreted to mean something else.

What this suggests is that the only way in which higher defence management can be reformed in the country is through the process of legislation, as has been the case in countries like the US, UK or Australia that follow systems similar to ours.[34] The virtue of legislation is that (1) it is extremely detailed, clearly outlining nomenclature, responsibility, authority, and sanctions; (2) it has the sanction of the law of the land which can be interpreted, but only up to a point, but it cannot be violated without the consequences of punishment; (3) it directly involves lawmakers in the process of writing the rules instead of having their intentions mediated by a bureaucracy.

Notes

1. For a summary of the Goldwater-Nichols Act see, Kathleen J McInnis, *Goldwater-Nichols at 30: Defence Reform and Issues for Congress* (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service Report R 44474 June 2, 2016), p. 6.
2. Manoj Joshi, "Xi Jinping and PLA Reform," Observer Research Foundation Occasional Paper No 88, February 2016.
3. P N Dhar, *Indira Gandhi, the 'Emergency', and Indian Democracy* (New Delhi: OUP, 2000), pp. 126, 138-139.
4. See USI National Security Lecture 2013 on "Civil-Military Relations: Opportunities and Challenges" by NN Vohra, Governor J&K, December 06, 2013 http://www.idsa.in/resources/speech/CivilMilitaryRelations_NNVohra
5. Srinath Raghavan, *War and Peace in Modern India: A Strategic History of the Nehru Years* (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2010), pp. 46-47.
6. SN Prasad et al, eds., Ministry of Defence, Government of India, *Operations in Jammu & Kashmir 1947-48* (New Delhi: History Division, GOI, 1987), p.37
7. See Raghavan, n.5, pp. 235-236.

8. Ibid., p.269. The issue that led to the problem related to General Thimayya's advice that India join hands with Pakistan to counter China.
9. The following section draws on Neville Maxwell, *India's China War* (revised and updated) [Dehradun: Natraj, 2015 (1970)].
10. PVR Rao, *Defence Without Drift* (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1970), p. 309. Rao was Defence Secretary from 1962-67.
11. Vohra, n. 4, section 28.
12. CP Srivastava, *Lal Bahadur Shastri: A Life of Truth in Politics* (New Delhi: OUP, 1995), pp. 212-26.
13. RD Pradhan, *1965 War: The Inside Story: Defence Minister Y B Chavan's Diary of India-Pakistan War* (New Delhi: Atlantic, 2007).
14. SN Prasad and U P Thapliyal, eds., *The India-Pakistan War of 1965: A History* (New Delhi: Natraj Publishers, Ministry of Defence, New Delhi, 2011), p. 311 and pp.314-315.
15. Dhar, n.3, pp. 160-161.
16. PC Alexander, *Through the Corridors of Power: An Insider's Story* (New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2004), p. 298.
17. Srinath Raghavan, *1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh* (Ranikhet: Permanent Black, 2013), pp. 67-70.
18. SN Prasad, ed., *History of the Indo-Pak War, 1971* (New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, 1992), pp. 279 and 797. In the review and reflections chapter, the editor pointed to the deficiencies in inter-Service cooperation and called for the setting up of integrated theatre commands and a Chief of Defence Staff organisation, noting that Manekshaw had, indeed, functioned like a CDS anyway with the backing of the PMO. He also advocated an integrated Ministry of Defence involving civilian and military officers to do away with needless duplication of work.
19. Manoj Joshi, "Operation Falcon: When Gen Sundarji Took the Chinese by Surprise," *The Quint,* July 01, 2017 https://www.thequint.com/opinion/2017/06/30/operation-falcon-sundarji-took-china-by-surprise
20. Major General Harkirat Singh (Retd), *Intervention in Sri Lanka: The IPKF Experience Retold* (New Delhi: Manohar, 2007), pp. 33- 34.
21. Ibid., pp. 125-126.
22. Anit Mukherjee, "Failing to Deliver: Post-Crises Defence Reforms in India, 1998-2010" [New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) Occasional Paper, No 18 March 2011], pp. 9-10. See also K Subrahmanyam's essay on "Structure and Personnel Policy of the Armed Forces, " in K. Subrahmanyam with Arthur Monterio, *Shedding Shibboleths: India's Evolving Strategic Outlook* (Delhi: Wordsmiths, 2005), pp. 64-67.
23. *Kargil Review Committee Report: From Surprise to Reckoning* (New Delhi: Sage, NSCS Secretariat, December 15, 1999), p. 221.
24. Ibid., p. 250.
25. Ibid., p. 252.
26. Ibid., pp. 258-259.
27. "Group of Ministers' Report on Reforming the National Security System", press release of the Government of India http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr2001/rmay2001/23052001/r2305200110.html

28. Standing Committee on Defence, 2009-2010, 15th Lok Sabha, Ministry of Defence, Action taken on recommendations in the thirty-sixth report (14th Lok Sabha) on "Status and Implementation of Unified Command for Armed Forces," *Second Report,* presented on December 16, 2009, pp. 3-4.
29. Manoj Joshi, "Policy Report: The Unending Quest to Reform India's National Security System," S Rajaratham School of International Studies, March 2014, p.3. http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/PR140301_The_Unending_Quest_to_Reform_India_National_Security_System.pdf
30. Ajai Shukla, "AK Antony's Intellectual Dishonesty," *Business Standard*, December 09, 2013 http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/ajai-shukla-a-k-antony-s-intellectual-dishonesty-113120901071_1.html , See also "No Hasty Decision on Top Military Post," *New Indian Express,* December 07, 2013 http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/No-Hasty-Decision-on-Top-Military-Post/2013/12/07/article1932635.ece#.UvoDe_vPL9o
31. Gaurav Vivek Bhatnagar, "Service Heads Agree to Permanent Chair for Chiefs of Staff Committee," *The Hindu,* December 03, 2013.
32. See interview of Lieutenant Gen D B Shekatkar in *The Times of India*, July 21, 2017.
33. Steven I Wilkinson, *Army and Nation: The Military and Indian Democracy Since Independence* (Ranikhet: Permanent Black, 2015), pp. 154-155.
34. In the US, Title 10 of the United States Code consolidates all the laws relating to the role of the armed forces of the US, their missions and organisation of each Services, as well as the functions and responsibilities of its officials. Every bit of it, especially the definitions and functions of individuals and agencies is backed by specific legislative authority or sanction.